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THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY IN A FEDERAL SYSTE M
A CHAPTER IN AUSTRALIAN

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ERIC ARmOUR BEECROFTO
Section 51 .(xxxv) of the Australian constitution1 grants
to the Commonwealth Parliament power to make laws with respect
to "conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement
of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one
State." The Commonwealth Parliament's law-making authority
over industry is limited to this one method; other means of control may be established only by the parliaments of the States.
Nothing would serve better than this clause to exhibit the confusion of thought and purposes which seemingly accompanies the
working of a federation. Almost every word of this clause has been
subjected to much judicial definition. It has been the subject of
more litigation than any provision in the constitution; and, as
a result of the judicial work of thirty years, an extraordinarily
confusing mass of doctrine has been developed. To-day, as one
eminent Australian lawyer has said, Australians must approach
industrial unrest with "a series of tests which, however logical in
the abstract, are almost grotesque in relation to the living facts of
industrial life. ' '2
One of the most significant phases of Australian constitutional
interpretation, therefore, has arisen from the attempts of workers,
lawyers, and politicians to make possible a common rule for
Australian industry. These attempts have had to be made through
the medium of constitutional reasoning in the High Court, because
they were frustrated, first, by the failure to secure, by amendment,
a Commonwealth legislative power over all industrial matters, and,
secondly, by the decision of the High Court that the Constitution
did not permit Parliament to confer such a general rule-making
power on the Arbitration tribunal.3 Economic necessity, as felt and
expressed by strong and well-organized group interests, usually
begets a good deal of legal invention. As a result of the vigorous
activities of national organizations of employers and employees
and the legal ingenuity which has been at their command, legis*Lecturer in Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles.
I Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12 (1900).
2
MENZIES, in Portus (ed.) STUDIES IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTUTION

(1933) 60.
3 Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v. Whybrow & Co., infra
n. 15.
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latures and courts in Australia have been under persistent pressure
to devise means for laying down uniform national rules governing
industrial relations.
It is well-known that the labor mo-iement was beginning to
extend itself beyond the borders of individual colonies some years
before federation. Strikes could be organized, and were organized,
on a national scale, before any national political institutions had
developed. Several classes of workers, including shearers, wharf
laborers, and maritime employees, developed widespread and
effective organization. Before 1900 a solidarity of both workers
and employers, transcending local boundaries, had been effectively
demonstrated to governmental authorities and to the public in a
number of paralyzing strikes.'
The majority of the constitution-framers, therefore, saw their
task as one of eliminating costly industrial conflict. The major
problem was conceived, not as one of furthering either socialism
or a repressive capitalism, but as the immediately practical problem
of preventing and settling strikes. Since they had noted the interstate e.%tension of unions, and the national industrial warfare, it
occurred to them that there might be a division of authority, in
keeping with the much-cherished federal principle and as a concession to the strong state-riglits sentiment. It was thought that
the migratory type of workers, who were less amenable to state
remedies, would be covered under the new Commonwealth power.'
This illogical and somewhat artificial provision, section 51
(xxxv), was put under a great strain as soon as it was utilized.
The pressure on the agencies of government to stretch the meaning
of its terms was relentless, because, from an early stage, the rapidly
growing national organizations with national aims, found themselves thwarted by the federal form of government,-especially by
the somewhat artificial and limited provision for conciliation and
arbitration. The Commonwealth powers seemed gravely inadequate
almost from the beginning.( Was the constitution framed without
sufficient knowledge of the basic social conflict which, even before
1900, was ruthlessly ignoring state lines?
4on industrial conditions in the '90s, see CoGELAN, STATISTICAL ACCoUNT
OF TIlE SEVEN COLONIES OF AUSTRALASIA, esp. 35-38 and 379-462; COGHLAN AND
EWING, PROGRESS OF AUSTRALASIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1903) 406
et seq.; REPORT AND MlINUTES OF EVIDENCE OF ROYAL COMMISSION ON STRIKES,

NEW SOUTH WALES (1891); and REEVES, STATE EXPERIMENTS IN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND (2 vols. 1923).
,Lengthy debates on these matters took place in the constitutional conventions. See CONVENTION DEBATES, ADELADE (1897) 782-793; MLBOURNE
(1898) 180-215.
c The most striking evidence of the dissatisfaction with the new instru-
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The answer to this must, I think, be in the affirmative. There
is ample evidence to show that the new system was ill-adapted to
cope with the social conflicts -peculiar to Australian life. It was
the result of a good deal of erudite discussion of existing federal
models, especially the American; and one may wonder whether
some portions of it would have been better drawn by a body of
contemporary labor leaders and industrialists less familiar with
Lord Bryce's American Commonwealth, which was quoted more
than any other work during the federation debates.7
A large body of opinion in the new Commonwealth Parliament
felt the necessity for dealing uniformly with conditions of
employment throughout Australia. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act was passed in 1904, and as I shall point out later, its
operations soon gave rise to vigorous legal battles. Most labor
leaders, in the unions and in parliament, soon came to favor a
full grant of industrial authority to the central Parliament. There
seemed to be a keen realization among these leaders that industry
had developed in such a way as to increase state competition,
rendering uniform industrial conditions more necessary than the
framers of the Constitution had realized. Referenda were held
in 1911 on proposals to enlarge the Commonwealth powers over
trade and industry. But these were rejected." In 1913, six proposals were offered in another referendum; but all were rejected,
though by trifling majorities. 9
Frustrated, therefore, by the conservative instrument of the
referendum, as well as numerous judicial decisions, the nationalizing
forces exerted much pressure on the Arbitration Court and the
High Court for the judicial expansion of the Constitution. The
work of the judiciary, therefore, is of central importance in
Australian economic, as well as constitutional, history.
The Common Rule
Parliament had placed in the Conciliation and Arbitration
Act a clause 38f which purported to give power to the Arbitration
ment was the unanimous passage in both houses of the Commonwealth Parliament, in the first session of 1901, of a resolution inviting the States to transfer
to the Commonwealth "full power to make laws for Australia as to wages
and hours and conditions of labor ..... " COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY
DEBATES (June 28, 1901) 1819.
7 The rather slavish dependence on the American model has been pointed
out by Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation (1930).
s QuicK, LEGIsLATivE PowERs, 19 et seq.

Obid, 22 et seq.
9
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Court to declare an award to be a common rule for the entire industry, binding disputants and non-disputants alike.
This provision came before the High Court for adjudication
at an early date in the Vhybrow Case. A description of this case,
from its origin as a dispute through the arbitration proceedings
and, finally, through the arguments before the High Court, will
illustrate the difficulties which were to face the judges for many
years afterward. The organized boot trade employees of four
states, who had been frequently in dispute with their employers,
formed a federal body, the Australian Boot Trade Employees'
Federation, in 1905. In June 1909, the secretary of this body wrote
a circular letter to each employer demanding certain conditions
and indicating that, if the demands were refused, application
would be made to the Arbitration Court. Thus a "dispute" was
created to enable the employees to bring the case before the Arbitration Court. When the "plaint" was filed and the "dispute"
came on for hearing before the Arbitration Court,10 the employees
claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction. They urged that the
demand was prepared merely to approach the Court; not to get
the demands conceded. Mr. Justice Higgins, President of the
Arbitration Court, believed that there was a genuine dispute with
respect to two of the twenty-three claims put forward. He emphasized especially that the employees, so long as they appealed only to
the state wages boards, were hampered by the fear of the competition of manufacturers of other states."
He quoted the Queensland Wages Board as having declared
this fear as the reason for fixing the minimum wage of 40 shillings
instead of 45 shillings as in the southern states. Also, he pointed
out, the New South Wales Arbitration Court had stated, regretfully, that, in common fairness to employers in New South Wales,
it could not raise wages to the point which seemed just. To do so
"would have put the manufacturers of Sydney under more onerous
terms than those of Melbourne.' 1 2 Mr. Justice Higgins concluded
that "no state court or board can do justice between employers
and employees in any industry in that state if there are competitors in other states whom the state court or board cannot control. "'Thus he made a strong case for federal control, though he
10 4 Comm. Arb.

Bep. 1 (1909).

- Ibid. at 8-9.
12 Boot Operators' Case, 7 N. S. W. Ind. Arb. Rep. 74, 79.
'3 Supra n. 10, at 25.
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admitted that, under the Constitution, his Court might lack the
power to exercise that control. When he had made his award and
the employers contested his authority to do so, on the ground
that there was no dispute within the meaning of the Constitution,
the High Court upheld his jurisdiction. 14
Later in the same year, the employees applied to have the
award declared to be a common rule of the boot-making industry
in five of the states. It was contended for the respondents, the
employers, that section 38f, which purported to authorize the
Arbitration Court to declare a common rule, was invalid. The
declaration of a common rule was not concilation or arbitration
within the meaning of section 51 (xxxv) of the constitution. It
was a legislative power which, under the Constitution, Parliament
itself could not exercise and, a fortiori, could not delegate to the
Arbitration Court. Those arguments were presented to the High
Court, when a case was stated for its decision.'
The counsel for the employees, in supporting the validity of
the common rule, contended that the constitutional provision,
section 51 (xxxv), was framed for the protection of the industry
and of the public; in every industrial dispute, there were concerned, besides the actual disputants, a large number of persons
having various interests in the subject-matter of the dispute; the
whole industry was affected. If arbitration was applicable to the
prevention of disputes, then the common rule might be made use
of in an arbitration to prevent disputes from arising.";
The High Court's decision was unanimous-one of the few
unanimous decisions in Australian constitutional cases-that the
declaration of a common rule, binding the whole industry, was not
conciliation or arbitration within the meaning of section 51 (xxxv).
Chief Justice Griffith and Sir Edmund Barton were inclined to
the view that there could be no arbitration to prevent a dispute.
There must be parties and subject-matter and something to
arbitrate upon. 7 The former accepted fully the argument of counsel
that section 38f of the Act was an attempted delegation of legislative authority which Parliament itself did not possess.' 8 The
other three judges recognized that the object of section 51 (xxxv)
14Rex v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation; ex parte Whybrow, etc., 11

C. L. R. 1 (1910).

25 Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v. Whybrow and Co., 11

C. L. R. 311 (1910).
16bid.

at 313-315.

37 Ibid. at 324.
18 bid. at 318.
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and of Parliament in enacting section 38f of the Act was the
maintenance of peaceful and orderly conditions of industry; but
they implied that the constitution, by limiting the means to conciliation and arbitration, had failed to provide adequate means.
According to Mr. Justice Isaacs, it was not for the Court to supplement the powers granted in the constitution, because the expected
result had not been obtained.1 9
Now, one of the most remarkable developments in Australian
constitutional law has been the judicial process through which,
in the course of time, a majority of the High Court has arrived
at approximately the same result which they had, seemingly, made
impossible by their unanimous decision in the Whybrow case.
It is not surprising, in view of the Whfybrow decision, that
attempts should be made by employees' organizations to extend
the application of the awards by simply extending the area of the
dispute. To do this required the collusion of fellow-workers in the
various states in serving a "log," or schedule, of claims upon
employers. By the use of a directory, the entire industry could be
included. Through this "expenditure of a few shillings in paper,
ink, and postage stamps," 20 the effect of a common rule for the
industry could be secured.
This subterfuge, of course, gave the judges a good deal of
trouble. What constituted a dispute?
Not long after the decision in the Whybrow case, an attempt
was made by the association comprising all the masters and officers
of Australian coastal vessels, to extend a dispute by sending a
letter to eighty-three separate ship-owners in different states, demanding certain specified conditions of employment. It was
intimated that the Arbitration Court would be appealed to unless
the demands were granted. Some of the employers replied, but
none consented to any part of the demands. Several weeks after
the letter was sent, a claim was filed2 ' in the Commonwealth Arbitration Court for the terms and conditions which the letter had
asked. The award was made, whereupon the ship-owners applied
in the High Court 22 for a writ of prohibition to restrain its enforcement. The employers claimed that, prior to receipt of the letter
from the union secretary, they had had no knowledge of any dis19 bid. at 338.
20 The words of Griffith, C. 3., in Sawmillers' Case, 8 C. L. R. 465, at
491 (1909).

21 6 Comm. Arb. Rep. 6 (1912).
22 Rex v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. 15 C. L. R.
586 (1912).
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content on the part of their employees. A majority of the High
Court agreed that, in this instance, there had been no real dispute,
extending beyond a state; the letter was merely an artifical means
of collusion in order to create a pretext for a claim before the
Commonwealth Arbitration Court. The Chief Justice declared
that the intention of the Constitution was,
"not to foment industrial war, or to interfere with the
domestic affairs of the States, but to prevent or compose disturbances of industrial peace likely to affect the whole
Commonwealth . ..."
The majority appeared to ignore, rather than clearly dispose of
the argument that the letter itself was evidence of demands and
that the refusal of the employers to concede the demands gave
rise to a dispute. While Mr. Justice Higgins, in the Arbitration
Court,2 3 had expressed the belief that there was a dispute "fairly
definite and of real substance," within the language of Conway v.
Wade, 24 Sir Edmund Barton referred to the same case as authority
for the view that "a grumbling or an agitation will not suffice,"
and held that here there was "not evidence even of these or either
of them." 25
The two senior Judges, Griffith and Barton, in many opinions,
had resorted to an underlying theory of the federal system, which
was expressed by the latter, in this case, as follows:
"This Court fulfils its highest obligations to the people,
and truly keeps the trust which they handed to it to defend,
when it insures that no attempt at unification on the one hand,
and on the other hand no straining of what are called State
Rights, shall be allowed to sap the sound foundations of the
edifice. "'I
The minority of the Court, Isaacs and Higgins, JJ., insisted that
there was a dispute. This was shown, they believed,. in the refusal
2:1Supra
24 (1909)

n.21, at 13.
A. C. 506, at 510.

25Supra n. 22, at 603-4.

26 Supra n. 22, at 604-605. As to the principle of "implied prohibitions,"
which dete-mined so many of the decisions of the senior judges in the early
days, see Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and Australian Federal Constitutional Law (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 345, 352 et. seq.
It is interesting to note that, in the Federation Convention, in 1898, both
Sir Edmund Barton and Mr. R. E. O'Connor, who were later to become High
Court Justices, opposed the inclusion of the arbitration clause in the Constitution, mainly on the ground that it interfered with powers which rightly
belonged to the States. See 1 RECORDS O' AusTRALIAN FEDERAL CONVENTION
(1898) 199-202.
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of employers to concede the demands, despite the knowledge, which
had been conveyed to them in apparent good faith, that the Arbitration Court would be appealed to if the demands were not
granted. Mr. Justice Isaacs dealt at length with the contention of
his colleagues that the absence of dissatisfaction prior to the
despatch of the latter, was a determining fact. With his usual insight into economic realities he pointed out the absurd result which
would follow from the employers' argument, if, instead of filing
a plaint in this case, the men had actually struck and thrown the
whole Commonwealth into confusion. Still, according to the argument, there would be no dispute.27 It was not necessary, thought
Mr. Justice Isaacs, "to strike or even threaten to strike in order
to convince the Court there is a dispute." He added that the interviews and meetings which had occurred in the various states
afforded plenty of evidence that, "if a background of dissatisfaction was necessary, it existed in the present case."
The majority had contended that a dispute could not extend
beyond the limits of one state and become subject to Commonwealth adjudication unless the business was interstate. In this
instance, it was shown that most of the respondent firms were
operating an intra-state business. In answer to this, Mr. Justice
Isaacs contended that "the question is not whether the industrial
operations of the employer extend but whether the 'industrial
dispute' extends." 2' 8 Again, in opposing the view of the Chief
Justice that the employers in different states lacked "a community
of interest," he declared that,
"if ....
the same industrial demand is made upon all
employers in Australia, all these employers would have in a
sufficient sense a community of interest in granting or refusing it. "29
From this decision, and the opinion given, no clearly stated
doctrine could be derived. It was evident, however, that the two
senior judges, Chief Justice G riffith and Sir Edmund Barton,
were devoted to a general state-rights principle in interpreting
this phase of the federal scheme. Their opinions also showed, as
indicated above, a well-marked tendency to view the issue through
the minds of the employers. Mr. Justice O'Connor occupied an
intermediate position. The two junior judges, Isaacs and Higgins,
in keeping with their usual interest in furthering the demands
2

7Supra n. 22, at 613.
28 Supra n. 22, at 623.
29Supra n. 22, at 624.
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of the rapidly growing national labor movement, were clearly
attempting to arrive at a workable formula for securing Commonwealth jurisdiction.
Some of the uncertainty appeared to be dispelled in 1913
when the High Court was called upon to decide a case similar, in
some respects, to the one last described. A demand had been made
by the employees on their employers and not conceded. The High
Court now allowed the Arbitration Court to take jurisdiction,
holding that pre-existing dissatisfaction communicated to or known
by the employers before the demand is not always a necessary
element to constitute an industrial dispute.2 0
About this time, however, another similar case arose. Felt hat
employees in three states, through a federal organization, sent to
all employers a schedule of wages and conditions and demanded
a reply within fourteen days as to whether the employers were
prepared to adopt the schedule or to grant a conference with the
union. No response was made and the plaint was filed in the
Arbitration Court. 31
Here again, when a case was stated for the High Court, 2 the
Chief Justice and Sir Edmund Barton insisted upon making the
issue one between the prevention and settlement of a "real" industrial dispute and "the creation of fictitious disputes with a
view to their settlement by a Commonwealth tribunal." The Chief
Justice again somewhat candidly revealed his employer-approach
by declaring that attempts had
"sometimes been made to take advantage of this provision of
the Constitution for the purpose of creating so-called disputes, not for the real purpose of preserving industrial peace
but for the purpose of taking
the control of industry out of
33
the hands of employers."
He added that "such attempts are a fraud upon the Constitution
and ought to be so treated."
Mr. Justice Higgins, dissenting with Mr. Justice Isaacs,
reiterated the view that the policy of the Act was to substitute
conciliation and arbitration for strikes. "There is no need," he
said, "for employers to strike, or throw the industry out of gear,
30 Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v. Newcastle and Hunter River
S. S. Co., (No. 2) 16 C. L. R. 705 (1913).
31 8 Comm. Arb. Rep. 346.
32 Felt Hatters' Case, 18 C. L. R. 88 (1914).
33 ibid. at 94.
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in order to establish the fact of a dispute.' "" Rather defiantly
replying to the Chief Justice, he declared that he knew
"of no attempts being made to take advantage of the provision in the Constitution for the purpose of creating disputes,
or for the purpose of disturbing industrial peace, or for the
purpose of taking the control of industry out of the hands
of the employers. This view seems to be based on a priori
utterances of partisan journals .. . .I cannot help thinking
that there is frequently a confusion of ideas between the
extension of discontent, which is usually reprehensible, and
the extension of the remedy for the discontent, which is
-proper and laudable." 3 5
In the Builders' Labourers' case in 1914 a question arose as
to whether the existence of a dispute extending beyond the limits
of a state depended upon the nature of the industry. The Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation had filed a plaint"8 against
a large number of employers in different states. Some of the employers obtained an order in the High Court 7 directing the
claimant organization to show cause why the Arbitration Court
should not be prohibited from further proceedings upon the award.
Chief Justice Griffith, now in a minority, repeated his views,
as expressed in the Felt Hatters' ease:-' The work to be done in
that industry," he said, "is essentially local in character, and the
conditions under which it is carried on are essentially dependent
upon local conditions. '*8 From this assumption, he and Sir Edmund Barton argued that there were in reality several distinct
disputes which had never become a single dispute. The Chief
Justice again made use of the so-called "implied prohibition"
doctrine,-that the grants of Commonwealth power contained in
section 51 of the Constitution should be construed as limited to
cases with which the states could not deal.
Mr. Justice Isaacs answered this view pragmatically: "Can
each State effectively settle the controversy within its own
borders?'"'s His reply to the pedantry of the Chief Justice was
very emphatic:
"We have consequently to consider the actual circumstances
of the industrial relations of the parties concerned, un34.bld. at 109.
35 Mbd. at 111.

30 7 Comm. Arb. Rep. 210.
37 The Builders' Labourers' Case, 18 C. L. R. 224 (1914).
38 bd. at 229
39 Ibid. at 240.
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embarrassed by legal theories that find no place in the words
conferring the power, that do not and cannot alter economic
realities and have no power to satisfy the material requirements of the contesting parties, or to supply the public wants
in case of interruption ....
"40
An important case involving the attempts to secure extension
of a dispute arose when, during certain Arbitration Court proceedings, 41 statements were submitted, signed by certain employees
stating that they had no dispute with their employers and were
satisfied with their conditions of labor.42 Mr. Justice Higgins,
strongly suspecting that the statements had been exacted under
threats, ignored them and made an award, purporting to bind even
the employers who had claimed the non-existence of a dispute.
The High Court, in Holyman's case,43 subsequently prohibited
the enforcement of the award so far as it related to the employers
and employees who had claimed to be satisfied. Mr. Justice Isaacs
dissented. Chief Justice Griffith followed his reasoning in the
Builders' Labourers' case. Though he mentioned the statements, he
considered them made in good faith and apparently ignored all
possibility of coercion. 4 4 Mr. Justice Isaacs, on the contrary, emphasized the element of coercion and supported his views with convincing statements of fact.4 5 He also urged, as he was to do in later
cases, that, where prohibition is asked for and the jurisdiction of the
tribunal is in question, the burden of proof is upon the applicant.
The decision in Holyman's case seemed to establish an effective
obstacle against the extension of disputes "on paper" and to nonunionists. It was difficult, however, owing to the nature of the
economic factors involved, to find any satisfactory formula by
which "disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state"
could be recognized beyond question, except by relying on the
"implied prohibition" theory, which prevailed on the bench until
1920. With the formally proclaimed abandonment of this doctrine
in the Engineers' case48 and the change in personnel on the High
Court, it was to be expected that a different view would be developed for the definition of disputes.
40 Ibid. at 244.

7 Comm. Arb. Rep. 92.
Ibid. at 97 et seq.
4318 C. L. R. 273 (1914).
44 Ibid. at 279.
41
42

43 Ibid. at 289-292.
46 Amalgamated Society

of Engineers v. Adelaide S. S. Co., 28 C. L. R.

129 (1920).
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Mr. Justice Isaacs had, in his dissenting opinions in the cases
previously discussed, urged the necessity for considering the
object of the arbitration clause, section 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution, as the maintenance of stable industrial conditions by the
peaceful cooperation of capital and labor. He had also pointed out
the fallacy which he felt was involved in any attempt to limit this
object by reference to an implied protection of "state-rights."
That his views would ultimately prevail in these cases concerning
disputes, as in many other matters, was indicated rather clearly
by the decision in Hudson's Case in 1923.47 The question was
as to the validity of section 3 of the Commonwealth Conciliation
and Arbitration Act, as amended in 1921, which provided that
an agreement between the parties to a dispute operates as an award
and binds, not only the parties to the agreement, but also the
successors and assignees or transmittees of the business of an
employer bound by the agreement. The validity of the section was
upheld.
By the reasoning in this case, the majority of the High Court
indicated that it was attaching more importance to the standing
and functions of the organizations, as such, in industrial disputes,
and that it regarded "arbitration" as being not confined to
definite persons who are parties to the dispute, as in an ordinary
action at law, but to the organizations, whose membership is continually changing. Mr. Justice Isaacs stated the view as follows:
what persons are intended to be affected as represented by the formal disputants, as well as what conditions
are to affect them and for what period of time? This at once
avoids the 'common rule,' which is an extension of the superficial area of dispute, and gives full effect to an award in
respect of the 'industrial dispute' by making it effective
throughout the whole period of operation of the award for
and against those who, during the period are, or voluntarily
come, within the area of the dispute.''4
This reasoning gave promise of providing the long-sought
formula for permitting virtually a common rule in inter-state industry, or at least allowing extensive benefits, under the awards,
to non-organized employees. And, indeed, the elaboration and
further application of the formula were soon made in the Burwood
4
Cinema case in 1924. 9
47Geo. Hudson v. Australian Timber Workers'
(1923).
4P Ibid. at 440.
40 35 C. L. R. 528 (1924).

Union, 32 C. L. R. 413
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This case is remarkable for the fact that it was made the
occasion for lengthy judicial exposition of the relations of persons
engaged in industry. As we have observed, the Court had been
finding itself in difficulty in making section 51 (xxxv) of the
Constitution work effectively. The time had come for bringing
some kind of guiding principles out of the mass of conflicting precedents and technicalities. Mr. Justice Isaacs' gift for lucid statement and his penetrating analysis of social situations once again
served to establish new and influential principles of interpretation
for the Court. In few passages in Australian law reports do we
find the judge giving such a systematic and deliberate exposition
of his concepts of social institutions. It seems justifiable, therefore,
to quote from this opinion at some length.
"Every employer that enters the competitive field of
industry is co-operating to carry it on, in the broader sense
in which the people of the Commonwealth are interested. That
sense is national service and supply, the interruption of which
is the evil dealt with in pl. xxxv. So also is every employee
a co-operator in the same sense, for his labor is not to be
looked upon as a mere commodity, as if he were a machine,
animate like the horse or inanimate like a steam-engine. The
nexus of all the co-operators is the industry itself, irrespective
of how its ownership or its operative arrangements are subdivided. If we confine our attention for the moment to disputes between employers and employed, we have to visualize
the disputants respectively as portions of groups representing
capital and labour. 'Employer' and 'employee' are terms
which denote not individuals contracting with each other
whose industrial relations arise out of and are limited by their
specific contracts, but membership of a group with which the
individual has identified himself in relation to a given industry. The concept has grown out of the necessity for collective bargaining and collective action, involving organization
more or less formal and more or less complete. Long before
1900 the identification of the individual with the group was
throughly established. In 1892, in Dr. Garran's report on New
South Wales, it was stated the 'the federation of labor and
the counter-federation of employers is the characteristic
question of the epoch. Without such identification there can
never be effective action to meet the difficulties of modern industrial life.' "0
Then 31r. Justice Isaacs quotes the following passage from the
Whitley Report r ' of Great Britain:
50 Tbd. at 540-541.
' Cd. 8606 of 1917, par. 23.
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" .... an essential condition of securing a permanent improvement in the relation between employers and employed
is that there should be adequate organization on the part of
both employers and work people. The proposals outlined for
joint co-operation throughout the several industries depend
for their ultimate success upon there being such organization
on both sides; and such organization is necessary also to provide means whereby the arrangements and agreements made
for the industry may be effectively carried out."
The learned justice then asks: "Why is 'organization' an 'essential
condition'?
"Plainly," he said, "because an 'industry or some selected
branch of it' is for the purpose regarded as one entity. It is
impossible to isolate the competitors and segregate their industrial interests. Every competitor acts and inter-acts, and
more or less affects the rest of those on the same fields. If,
then, section 51 (xxxv) of the Australian Constitution is to be
faithfully applied in the broad sense already adopted, so as
to be effective to cope with the destructive evil of industrial
warfare, it must necessarily be competent to provide by conciliation and arbitration for the essential condition referred
tb. That is to say, while the 'common rule' as one extreme
is excluded, so a limitation to individual contract as the other
extreme is also excluded. Employers who voluntarily enter
and compete on the same field of industry and thereby affect
the industrial relations of all others on that field-unionist and
non-unionist-cannot escape the result of their voluntary
action by merely excluding union labor."
The paragraphs I have quoted represent, I believe, an approach
to a carefully elaborated statement of the prevailing political
philosophy in Australia. They are, indeed, among the few abstract
expositions one can find of the practical policies of a people who
have habitually actea without doctrines. It has become a commonplace that, in the federal systems of the modern world, it falls to
jurists to formulate social theories. Courts, in such a system, become battlegrounds for clashing social forces. They cannot, therefore, remain entirely unaware of the major social issues which are
being fought out before them and which are, at least temporarily,
settled by their decisions. The able judge in a federal system,
therefore, feels impelled to give thought to the social effects of his
work. This awareness of social consequences in turn makes it impossible for him, in his own conscience at least, if not in his official
capacity, to escape responsibility for those consequences.
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Mr. Justice Isaacs (now Sir Isaae.Isaaes, Governor-General of
Australia) has been the ablest and most articulate of those who
have striven deliberately, through judicial formulas, to adapt the
federal system to economic realities. In the light of the Constitution, the decision in the Whybrow case had seemed inescapable,
even to the judges who were entirely convinced of the social advantages of the common rule. Yet, after much vacillation and confusion, a formula was discovered permitting the extension of
awards to employers and employees who are not parties to the
dispute. In the Burwood Cinema case, the High Court frankly
over-ruled Holyman's case in part and made possible, in some
instances at least, the actual effect of a common rule in interstate
industry.2
Numerous awards now include the so-called "drag-net"
clauses. Though these clauses do not directly declare a common
rule, they often have the same effect; for unions, in applying for
them, made all employers in the particular industry respondents,
whether they employed any members of the union or not."
In what respects do such awards now fall short of the common
rule? There is still much uncertainty with respect to the rights
and obligations of parties. Much confusion is caused to employers
who have a variety of employees. The employers of a firm may, for
example, be members of three different unions subject to three
different awards. Some employees may be non-unionists or may be
members of more than one of the unions.
Two decisions in recent years indicate that there are still substantial limitations on the Arbitration Court's authority to extend
the effect of an award beyond those persons immediately in dispute.
In the Allerdice case the question was whether employees in one
union could be bound, as to hours, by an award secured by another
union. The High Court was unanimous in deciding that they were
not so bound. 4 The grounds for the decision, however, were very
diverse. When a similar case arose later,55 the Court divided. The
question was whether an award of the "drag-net" type was bind52 Further discussion of the Burwood Cinema and later cases may be found
in Kelly, Arbitration Awards Affecting Non-Unionists (1928) 1 AUSTRALIAN
L. J. 296-298.
53 See e. g., the Theatrical Amusement Employees' Award, 23 Comm. Arb.
Rep. 379 (1926); and the Musicians' Union Award, 24 Comm. Arb. Rep.
574, 582 (1926).
54Amalgamated Engineering Union v. Allerdice Pty. Ltd., 41 C. L. B.
402 (1928).
55 American Dry Cleaning Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades
Union of Australia, 43 C. L. R. 29 (1929).
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ing on an employer who employed no persons who were parties to

the dispute as members of the claimant organization or represented
by it. Three of the judges held to the view which they had expressed in the Allerdice case that the Arbitration Court lacked
power to extend the award to cover employees who were neither
parties to the dispute nor members of nor represented by an organization which was a party to that dispute. Sir Isaac Isaacs dissented. He suggested reopening the Allerdice case, on account of
the confusion concerning its effect.5 6
The decisions in these two cases seem to limit the effect of the
principle declared in the Burwood Cinema case. Yet the opinions
have been so inconclusive that one cannot say what line of interpretation may be taken in the future. Perhaps it is worth remembering, however, that, it is after such periods of confusion that, in
the past, judicial minds have finally found themselves forced to
enunciate clear-cut principles. These clear-cut principles have
usually led to an extension of Commonwealth powers and greater
freedom for the development of a national economic policy. Where
it is difficult to find a reasoned justification for a compromise, the
Court has not unnaturally given way to the pressure of practical
economic necessity.
It is interesting to notice that the Commonwealth Parliament
attempted in 1928 to take advantage of the encouragement offered
by the recent High Court decisions. It passed an amendment to
the Arbitration Act to facilitate the serving of claims on numerous
persons; in other words, to enable the organizations to save the
expenditure on "paper, ink and postage stamps" which Chief
Justice Griffith had once said could not be permitted, because it
would enable "mere mischief-makers" to create a dispute. 7 By
this amendment, clause 19B of the principal Act"3 now provides
that the Arbitration Court may make an order appointing "representative respondents" and that, the order having been published
in the Commonwealth Gazette, all documents served on the representative respondents shall be deemed to have been served on all
the interested persons specified in the order, and further, that
any award of the Court made in the matter should then be binding
on those interested persons. This legislation, of course, could not
" A discussion of the Allerdice and American Dry Cleaning Co. cases may
be found in Ross, Attempts to Establish a Common Bule in Interstate Industry (1930) 4 AusT sRAN L. J. 73-76.
S7rSupra n. 20.
5s Clause 16 of the amending act (No. 18 of 1928).
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affect in any way the validity of the awards that might be made
under this type of procedure. It merely made easier the method
which had already developed for extending the area of disputes
and which had received encouragement from such decisions as
those in the Burwood Cinema case.
The serious results of the present system of industrial control are apparent in the Coal-miners' cases in 1930r" A very bitter
dispute between employers and miners arose in the New South
Wales coal fields in 1929. Fearing that a great national dispute
was imminent and that such a dispute would be beyond the power
of any one state to control, Chief Judge Dethridge of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, directed Judge Beeby to summon a conference of owners and employees of New South Wales.' The conference was held but was ineffectual. Judge Beeby then referred
the dispute to the Arbitration Court for hearing. An interim
award, affecting the conditions of employment in New South
Wales, was made in December, 1929. The employers contested the
validity of the award on the ground that the dispute did not
extend beyond one State. The High Court held that the Arbitration
Court lacked jurisdiction and the award was invalidated. Some
of the majority believed that the circumstances did not justify
the intervention of the Arbitration Court.
Sir Isaac Isaacs, in one of the most vigorous dissenting opinions
of his career, 0 declared that "the circumstances not only justified,
but loudly demanded, the intervention of the Arbitration Court."
To support this belief, he described the events leading up to the
dispute, drew attention to the imminence of a sympathetic strike
in Queensland and Victoria and showed that for many years the
coal-mining industry of these three states had been working under
Federal awards made by the Coal Tribunal under the Industrial
Peace Act of 1920.
After this decision, the matter came before the Arbitration
Court again in a different manner: by the presentation of a log
of claims upon the employers in New South Wales. In adjudicating
upon this case, the majority of the High Court (Sir Isaac Isaacs
again dissenting) held that the log was not sincerely propounded
to employers in New South Wales as a demand upon which the
employees were resolved to insist, but was regarded by all parties
59 Caledonian Collieries Ltd. v. Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, 42 C. L. R. 527 (1930).
60 Tbid. at 538 et seq.
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as nothing but a step toward enabling the Arbitration Court to
deal with the trouble.
Sir Isaac Isaacs gave great emphasis in both of his dissenting
opinions to a point which he had made in earlier cases: namely,
that the party demanding a writ of prohibition against the Arbitration Court must make a clear case. He felt that, on the matter
of jurisdiction of that Court to make an award, Judge Beeby's
view "ought not to be overridden unless he was clearing wrong." 6'
In the second case he said:
"It would be a valiant heart that would maintain that Judge
Beeby, with his special and extensive experience of the subject
was 'manifestly wrong.' On the contrary he appears to me
to have been manifestly right.''2
The majority opinion that the claims were not genuine, the
dissenting Justice apparently did not share, for he declared that
"when . . . . the claims are in earnest and are persisted in
to the fighting point, notwithstanding firm refusals, we are
not to8 wait for casualties to convince us that the combat is
real."
Sir Isaac Isaacs complained, as he had in earlier cases that.,
"in the present intricate state of legislation," parties to the disputes could raise "meticulous technicalities suggested by ingenious
legal minds."' 84 He went somewhat out of his judicial role when
he spoke despairingly of the apparent failure to invest the Arbitration Court with power to decide authoritatively and finally the
fact of a dispute, "the very foundation of its arbitral proceedings." He apparently felt that any attempt to apply technical
limitations in defining industrial disputes was bound to be unworkable.
It is needless to say that the present results of judicial interpretation are perplexing in the extreme to those who are concerned
with the solution of industrial problems. When a serious strike
occurs or is threatened, endangering the peace and material welfare of the entire Commonwealth, a question must be settled as
to whether the Commonwealth tribunal may intervene. The Arbitration Cot, and later the High Court, in case a question of law
is raised, must determine (1) the geographical extent of the dis6'

Ibi. at 540.

62

nid. at 568.

63 Ibid. at 571.
64Ibid. at 540.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss3/3

18

Beecroft: The Control of Industry in a Federal System: A Chapter in Austral
THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY
pute (whether the dispute "extends" over more than one state
and is not two or more separate disputes, merely occurring at the
same time) ; (2) the intentions of the parties to the dispute
(whether they are engaged in a "real" dispute or merely engaged
in "paper" formalities in order to establish the jurisdiction of a
supposedly favorable Commonwealth tribunal), and often many
other matters.
Early in his experience in the Arbitration Court, Mr. Justice
Higgins complained of the immense amount of the time of his
Court which was occupied with lengthy and complicated arguments
as to the facts which tend to show that there is or is not a dispute,
as well as with other matters which had no bearing on the merits
of the case. The discussion of the merits cost relatively little in
terms of either time or expese-8 "
This administrative inefficiency is, however, a relatively
minor problem. The great maze of legal technicalities, some of
which have been presented above, divert the attention, not only
of the parties but of the entire public, from the basic issues of
industrial control.
65 4 Comm. Arb. Rep. 1, at 36 (1909).
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